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not by the latter, 3 especially since property judgments are normally paid out
of the parent's assets, whereas insurance often covers tort judgments.74
It has been argued that even partial abrogation of the doctrine will
eventually cause the courts to extend this reasoning to all parental torts, including those within the sanctity of the home. 7 5 Total abrogation of the
doctrine, however, would not be an unsatisfactory result if the Gibson court's
approach of adopting the reasonably prudent parent standard is followed. 76
Adoption of the reasonably prudent parent standard would allow courts to take
into consideration the policies supporting parental immunity. Immunity would
be granted in those cases where such policies actually outweighed the societal
interest in providing negligently injured persons with a remedy.
Basic tort principles demand that personal wrongs be remedied. The Florida
Supreme Court has failed to accept this maxim, and in the process, has denied
a large class of plaintiffs redress. The instant decision does little to change the
court's adherence to the parental tort immunity doctrine. The court fails to
recognize the parent-child relationship in its full focus. Parents undeniably require a certain amount of discretion and authority in raising their children.
The instant decision, however, grants parents too much discretion. The court
should have abrogated the immunity doctrine and adopted a standard of
reasonableness viewed in light of the parental role. By adopting the Gibson
standard in this state, our judicial system would assure both parent and child
of a proper and fair adjudication of their claims.
CHARLES
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE STANDING CLARIFIED
American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v.
Rabun County Chamber of Commerce,
678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982)
Appellant, Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, dedicated a large
illuminated Christian cross' to a Georgia state park. 2 Appellees, the American
73. See McCurdy I, supra note 10, at 1075 ("It is common knowledge that some of the
most acrimonious family disputes have arisen in respect to property.").
74. See Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 919, 479 P.2d at 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
75. 414 So. 2d at 1070 (Boyd, J., dissenting). See also Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 90, 471
P.2d 282, 286 (1970) (McFarland, J., dissenting) (fearing that parent could be held liable for
any household injury).
76. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
1. 678 F.2d 1379, 1382 (llth Cir. 1982).
2. Id. at 1382. Defendant, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, suggested drafting
a resolution declaring the cross a war memorial in an attempt to avoid the establishment clause
conflict. The resolution failed. Defendant State of Georgia refused to enforce the subsequent
order of the Department of Natural Resources to remove the cross. The district court's order
of removal was stayed pending the outcome of the instant case, but an injunction against
illumination stayed in effect throughout. Id.
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Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Georgia and five individuals, brought suit
in federal district court to enjoin appellant from maintaining the cross on
public property in violation of the establishment clause in the first amendment
of the United States Constitution.3 The district court ruled that the plaintiffs
had standing to bring suit and seek the cross's removal.4 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and HELD, the appellees demonstrated sufficient non-economic injury to establish standing in federal court. 5
The standing requirement derives from the Article III cases and controversies provision of the United States Constitution.6 It focuses on a party's
right to instigate litigation in federal court. 7 A plaintiff must evince sufficient
personal interest in a case's outcome to warrant judicial attention to the issues
raised.8 Plaintiffs alleging physical or direct economic injury rarely face standing problems.9 When a constitutional issue is raised, however, standing has
proven a substantial limitation on federal court access.' 0 A plaintiff must claim
specific personal injury resulted from the defendant's allegedly unconstitutional
conduct.11
Standing has been almost excluively a twentieth century concern.12 Courts
have only recently addressed the issue in establishment clause claims.' s The
United States Supreme Court first granted standing under the establishment
clause in the leading case of Abington School District v. Schemp.' 4 The parents

of students sued to enjoin Pennsylvania from enforcing a statute requiring
daily Bible reading in public schools.' 5 The Court explained that establishment clause claims result from governmental non-neutrality in the advancement or inhibition of religion.16 Unlike the free exercise clause, establishment claims do not require proof that a specific religious freedom was violated.7
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1889.
6. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 2.
7. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968). The Court stated: "The fundamental
aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Id. at 99.
8. Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186, 204 (1966).
9. J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CoNsTrITIoNAL LAW 73-79 (1978).
10. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982) (spiritual stake in first amendment values insufficient for
standing); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 492 (1952) (standing denied in establishment
clause claim).
11. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 US. 91, 99 (1979).
12. See Albert, Justiciabilityand Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship,50
S. CAL. L. REv. 1139, 1144 (1977).
13. The first substantial discussion of establishment clause standing came in the case of
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 492 (1952).
14. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
15. Id. at 205. The statute, 24 PA. STAT. § 15-1516 as amended, Pub. L. 1928 (Supp. 1960),
read: "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible should be read, without comment, at the
opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible
reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or
guardian." Id.
16. 374 U.S. at 222-24,
17. Id. at 223-24.
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In Abington, the government action breached neutrality standards because
students had to either refuse to attend the prayer reading or subject themselves to the religious exercise."' The Court found the requisite personal injury
to confirm standing 19 and held the statute violated the establishment clause of
the first amendment. 20 Abington established that a plaintiff without physical
or economic injury may litigate establishment clause claims in federal court. 21
Non-economic and non-physical injury were asserted as grounds for standing again in Sierra Club v. Morton.22 Although not an establishment clause
case, Sierra Club is an important link in the doctrinal development of standing.2 3 The Sierra Club, a non-profit organization dedicated to preserving
national parks, sought to prevent the federal government from issuing 2 a4
permit allowing commercial development of the Mineral King Valley.
Plaintiff's alleged injury stemmed from anticipated deleterious changes in the
valley if development were allowed. 25 A divided Court rejected the Club's
26
claim of standing as a representative of the public. The Court, however,
averred that the Club would have established standing had it alleged that
any individual member's use of the park would be affected by the proposed
27
development.
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State,28 the Supreme Court reevaluated the personal injury requirement for standing to bring an establishment clause claim. Plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the government from gratuitously transferring surplus
federal property to a religious organization. 29 The plaintiffs claimed standing
as taxpayers concerned about the use of tax dollars to support a religious
institution. 30 The Court held plaintiffs lacked standing since they failed to
show clear and tangible personal injury.2 1 Rejecting any exception for establishment clause claims,32 the Court found plaintiff's claim indistinguishable
18. Id. at 223-25.
19. Id. at 224 n.9 (since the children could not bring suit in their own right the Court
considered the parents directly affected and conferred standing on both).
20. Id. at 226.
21. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
22. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
23. The Club sought standing under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1976). Because the injury in fact requirement is a constitutional minimum, the person
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action" must still meet the minimum requirements. 405 U.S. at 735.
24. 405 U.S. at 730.
25. Id. at 734.
26. Id. at 734-35.
27. Id. at 735.
28. 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
29. Id. at 756-57. The property was disposed of under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 378, 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-544 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
102 S. Ct. at 755.
30. 102 S. Ct. at 757, 761. A detailed analysis of taxpayer standing is beyond the scope
of this comment. See generally Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court -A Functional Analysis,
86 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1973).

31.

102 S. Ct. at 767.

32.

Id.
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from the general interest shared by all citizens in preserving constitutional
33
governance.
Despite its refusal to grant standing, the Valley Forge Court specifically reaffirmed that standing may be granted on the basis of non-economic injury.3 4
Article III's "irreducible minimum" standard of injury requires the plaintiff
to show some personal injury, either actual or threatened, resulting from the
defendant's allegedly illegal conduct.3 5 The plaintiff must also demonstrate
that the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable decision. 86 Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion stressed that the establishment clause does not
grant overzealous plaintiffs authority to search out and challenge governmental action as ombudsmen for the public weal. 37
The instant court attempted to differentiate between the plaintiffs' valid
personal injury claim in Abington and the insufficient general grievance in
Valley Forge.38 As in Abington, the instant plaintiffs demonstrated individual
injury39 rather than a mere affront to their interpretation of the establishment
clause. 40 The cross was located next to a public campsite and two of the
plaintiffs were campers. 41 Both testified they had not and would not use
Black Rock Mountain State Park solely because of the cross's presence.42 Thus,
the court found injury because the plaintiffs were forced to use other parks or
endure the offending religious symbol. 43 The court viewed this injury as similar
33. Id. at 764.
34. Id. at 766. The Court cited United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) as an
example of sufficient non-economic injury. It would be difficult to conceive of a more attenuated injury than found in SCRAP. The plaintiffs alleged that a proposed rail freight increase would discourage the transportation of recyclable materials, retarding their use and
causing a greater consumption of local natural resources. It also would lead to, greater
amounts of refuse left in Washington area national parks, which the plaintiffs themselves used.
The Court thus found a specific injury separating the plaintiffs from all other citizens who
had not used the park. Id. at 689.
35. 102 S. Ct. at 758.
36. Id.

37. Id. at 766. The majority also listed three policies in Article MI that implicitly prompt
the personal injury requirement: judicial realism, restriction of factually different lawsuits,
and maintenance of the autonomy of those affected by a judicial decree. Id. at 758-59.
38. The court recognized that all three plaintiffs were asserting similar constitutional
claims. Any distinction, therefore, could only be based on facts. 678 F.2d at 1388.
39. Id. at 1388-89.
40. See id. The district court found standing for the plaintiffs based on their "spiritual
stake in First Amendment values." 510 F. Supp. at 890 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)). Since that holding was no longerviable after Valley Forge, the instant court followed the majority's example in Valley Forge
and examined the facts for other injury. 678 F.2d at 1384.
41. 678 F.2d at 1384.
42. Id. at 1388.
43. Id. While such an injury is not severe, magnitude of harm has never been a consideration in standing. See Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cim. L. REV. 601,
614 (1968). To illustrate that it is not illogical to allow standing for a "trifling" injury yet
deny it for no injury, Davis used a common law example. In an action for trespass, battery,
or assault, the act that gives rise to a cause of action may be so insignificant that no injury
is apparent. Yet that "trifling" is the difference between a legally cognizable injury and nothing
at all. Id.
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to that borne by the plaintiffs in Abington. 44
The defendants argued the alleged injury was analogous to that in Valley
Forge because both plaintiffs lived more than one hundred miles from the
campsite4 5 and neither actually camped in Black Rock Mountain State Park. 4"

Only one plaintiff had seen the cross prior to filing suit, and then only from
an airplane overhead. 47 Rejecting these arguments, the court stressed the
plaintiffs were Georgia citizens who frequently used the state park system.48
In the court's view, requiring actual use of the park before bringing suit
would reduce Article III to a bare technicality. 49 Since the two campers met
the standing requirements based on the finding of true injury, the court found
it unnecessary to inquire into the remaining plaintiffs' status. 50
The instant court abided by constitutional constraints and precedent.5 1
Despite the lack of a clear standard for determining standing,5 2- the court carefully examined the factual differences between the instant case and Valley
Forge.53 The Valley Forge plaintiffs claimed no more injury than that suffered
by all citizens resulting from a breach of constitutional governance. 4 The
instant plaintiffs, however, demonstrated personal, palpable injury stemming
from their inability to use a public facility because it contained an offensive

44. 678 F.2d at 1389.
45. Id. at 1888-84.
46. Id. at 1388 n.18. The cross had been in the park since 1957. Plaintiffs testified that
they had not used the park specifically because of the cross's presence there. Id.
47. Id. at 1388.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1388 n.18.
50. Id. at 1389. The court cited Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 102 S. Ct. 205
(1981), to support its determination. In Watt, nine consumer groups, two state government
entities, and three private citizens filed suit against the United States and the secretaries of
Energy and Interior. Respondents alleged that the secretaries misused their discretion by not
employing a specific bidding procedure when leasing offshore oil and gas tracts. Id. at 211. Because the State of California was found to have standing, the court declared it was not
necessary to consider the status o1f the other plaintiffs. Id.
51. For example, the decision comports with Gladstone Realtors v. City of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91 (1979), which determined a plaintiff must show actual or threatened injury to satisfy
the case and controversy requirement of Article III. In the context of environmental concerns,
an effect on a person's use and enjoyment of land is sufficient non-economic injury to confer
standing. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). See also
Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (plaintiffs, residents of Washington, D.C., had establishment clause standing to challenge placement of illuminated nativity in park near
White House).
52. Standing is a protean subject. One commentator has called it "among the most
amorphous in the entire domain of public law." Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 498
(1966). Another authority flatly pronounced the Supreme Court's law of standing as "cluttered,
confused, and contradictory. ... 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVvE LAW TREATISE § 22.18 (Supp.
1965). Even Justice Frankfurter, "found himself reduced to a nearly unprecedented degree of
inarticulateness" when discussing the standing concept. L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 461 (1965).

53.
54.

678 F.2d at 1388.
102 S. Ct. at 764. In denying standing, the Court noted the plaintiffs' lack of par.

ticularized injury. Id.
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religious symbol.5 5 This personal injury in fact s 6 satisfied the requirements for
standing to sue in federal court. 57 By emphasizing these salient facts, the court
granted standing without violating Valley Forge's restrictive holding. 5
Although the instant decision dearly falls within the conceptual parameters
of Valley Forge,59 it may result in greater access to federal courts. 60 By utilizing
the Valley Forge analysis to find standing through non-economic, non-physical
injury, the court has clarified the barriers facing subsequent plaintiffs who
attempt to litigate establishment clause claims. 61 In this sense, the instant
decision "liberalized" standing requirements. Commentators suggesting a more
liberalized standing doctrine have been criticized as ignoring Article III's
implicit policy concerns. 62 Doctrinal relaxation would supposedly encourage
trivial and collusive suits forcing the federal courts from their proper role of
resolving actual controversies. 63 Such criticism is inapplicable to the instant
55. 678 F.2d at 1389. The establishment clause issue was readily decided in the plaintiff's
favor. The cross was a religious symbol placed in a public park with the encouragement of the
county officials. Because such a state-supported religious symbol violated the required governmental neutrality, the district court's decision was promptly affirmed. Id. at 1391.
56. Id. The injury in fact must be more than a "mere psychological reaction" caused
by the offending symbolism. Id. at 1388. Plaintiffs will have to show that the religious symbol
either prevented them from using the public facility or made them bear an onerous burden
in subjecting themselves to the religious symbolism. Id. at 1388-89.
57. The court must also determine that a favorable decision will redress the claimed
injury, although this requirement was not questioned in the instant case. Id. at 1384 n.10.
This requirement, plus the requirement of actual or threatened injury caused by the
challenged action, comprise the constitutional minimum. See Scott, supra note 30, at 669. Additional prudential requisites are sometimes sought by the court. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 US.
83, 99 (1968) ("double nexus" required by the Court in taxpayer suit in addition to the
constitutional minimum).
58. 678 F.2d at 1383-84. The court reasoned that standing was consistent with the Valley
Forge rationale because the plaintiffs-appellees demonstrated "a cognizable injury in fact
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this court." Id. at 1384.
59. Id. at 1386-89. The court was extremely careful to base its standing finding on Valley
Forge and its predecessors. Id.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56. For one Justice's opinion on the necessity
of expansive federal court access, see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
61. The instant decision's formulation of sufficient personal injury to confer standing
applies only to non-taxpayer claims under the establishment clause. Since the instant case
was not a taxpayer's suit, those wishing to challenge the constitutionality of governmental
action as taxpayers will have to rely on Valley Forge. It is also unclear whether this opinion
might be used to establish standing for first amendment free exercise claims. As Justice
Brennan's emphatic dissent pointed out, the majority's reasoning in Valley Forge resulted
in an opinion that "tend[s] merely to obfuscate, rather than inform, our understanding of the
meaning of rights under the law." 102 S. Ct. at 768 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Those who would prefer to see standing requirements relaxed to the constitutional
minimum include University of Chicago Professor Kenneth Culp Davis and Justice William
Brennan. See Scott, supra note 30, at 669. For an opposing viewpoint, see Sager, Insular Majorities Abated, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1378 (1978) ("Marbury Model" endangered by the
loosening of the personal stake requirements asserting that standing could then be "conferred
on a plaintiff whose only concern is concern itself... ."). Id. Cf. Albert, supra note 12, at 1148
('alluring simplicity of entitling persons significantly aggrieved to relief is illusory."). Id.
63. See L. TRmE, AAimuc.m CONsTrrrTiONAL LAw 69-71 (1978). A suit is collusive when an
individual or organization brings an action not intended to settle an actual controversy
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